FAQs about Sexual Harassment
 
What is sexual harassment?
 
Sexual harassment is a form of sexual discrimination, which is forbidden by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII applies to most workplaces with 15 or more employees. Louisiana has similar protections in workplaces with 20 or more employees.

Sexual harassment involves unwanted sexual advances, touching, requests for dates or sex, frequent comments, or other behavior that creates an atmosphere riddled with demeaning, insulting or pornographic references to sex or your gender.
 
Is there a difference between harassment by a supervisor and a co-worker?
 
Yes. If a supervisor ties your job or job progression to sexual favors, your company is liable for the harassment. For example, a supervisor may state or imply that your job is at stake if you do not meet his demands for sexual attention. Having a sexual relationship with a supervisor is not a legitimate job condition for any legal job.

Co-worker harassment is different, since co-workers do not have direct control over your employment. Instead, co-worker harassment typically takes the form of a hostile work environment. A co-worker creates a hostile work environment by asking for sexual favors, making unwanted sexual advances or treating you like a sexual object. In that case your company is liable for the co-worker’s conduct only if it permits, encourages, or causes the atmosphere in which the sexual content becomes intolerable to a reasonable employee.
 
How much harassment does a reasonable employee have to tolerate?
 
You should tolerate very little. If someone’s conduct offends you, tell him or her. That will often make it stop.

Before a court will order your employer to pay you for putting up with a co-worker’s harassment, however, it must be "severe and pervasive". Lewd jokes, ostracism, pornography, and sexual comments may all create an environment where sexually harassing conduct is severe or pervasive. Unless very serious, one incident or isolated comment will not be enough to render the work environment hostile. In addition, you must tell your employer about the co-worker’s harassment before courts will hold your employer responsible, unless the harassment comes from a supervisor.
 
Why do people sexually harass others?
 
Sexual harassment is sometimes, but not always, motivated by sexual desire. Sometimes it is motivated by contempt for or hostility toward one gender. Perhaps some people are pigs who like to intimidate others. Whatever the case, sexual harassment is unlawful. You do not have to put up with it.
 
Should I tell someone if I feel I’ve been sexually harassed?
 
Absolutely. You certainly should let the harasser or harassers know that their behavior is offensive. If that does not help, then you need to take your complaints up the ladder. If your employer has an anti-sexual harassment policy, you should make a complaint using that policy’s procedure. A recent Supreme Court case lets the employer off the hook if the employee unreasonably ignores the policy. Well-designed policies identify more than one possible person to complain to, and explain the kind of investigation that the company will take.

Even if your company’s policy does not require it, the best practice is to write out your complaint, so that you don’t forget anything important, and you have a record of what you said. Keep your complaint factual, but don’t leave out the embarrassing parts. You may want to consider telling at least one trusted work friend about the harassment as well and keep a diary of the harassing conduct and what you did to stop it. Sometimes that is regarded later as convincing proof that you are not making up events after the fact.
 
What if the person harassing me is the one that sexual harassment complaints go to?
 
Good question. Even if the harasser is the company president, you should let him or her know that you consider his or her behavior unwelcome, unpleasant, and unacceptable in the workplace. Again, doing this in writing is a good practice and may make it easier on you if it is difficult to confront the harasser face to face. If the conduct continues despite your complaint, do the next most reasonable thing, such as going to the personnel department, the harasser’s supervisor, or even members of a board of directors.
 
Can my employer fire me for filing a complaint?
 
Not legally. Discipline for filing a complaint or speaking up on someone’s behalf is called retaliation. It is illegal. Some policies state that filing a false claim of sexual harassment may lead to your termination. Your employer will still be guilty of retaliation if it punishes you, however, where you make a good faith claim of sexual harassment, even if the employer is unable to corroborate it, even if the behavior is not so severe as to be sexual harassment, and even if you don’t win on the sexual harassment claim in court.

It is unclear how courts would rule on a retaliation claim if the employer proves that the sexual harassment charge was malicious and false. Unless you have a good faith belief that conduct amounts to sexual harassment, you should not file a complaint.
 
Does the sexual harassment law protect men from a female’s harassment?
 
Yes. Men who are harassed by women can file claims, and men harassed by men (as well as women harassed by women) are protected by the law, so long as the basis for the harassment is the gender of the victim.
 
Does sexual harassment law apply to harassment by customers?
 
Yes, as long as the employer knows about the offensive behavior and has a chance to fix the problem. Customer harassment is a lot like co-worker harassment. Until you speak up, the employer may not have enough reason to suspect that the company’s client is harassing you and making your job miserable.
 
What can I do if the harassment continues after I complain?
 
Keep a journal of your experiences, and keep the journal at home, not at your desk. Notice who else is being harassed, if anyone, and who else is in a position to notice the harassment. Keep copies of all of your complaints, and any written harassment (notes, e-mails, etc.) If you feel that the behavior is keeping you from a deserved promotion, write down the reason for that idea. Keep copies of your performance evaluations.

If you are threatened, take care of yourself first. No job is worth being raped or sexually assaulted. If the behavior is adversely affecting your emotional health, raising your blood pressure too high, or otherwise ruining your happiness, consider leaving the situation (inside the company or out), even if it makes it harder for you to prove a case of sexual harassment. At some point you need to weigh the job against your own well-being.

If the situation does not improve, contact a lawyer, see a counselor if needed, and most importantly, file a timely charge with the equal employment opportunity commission (federal or local). You have 300 days (sometimes a little more, depending on your state) to file an administrative claim with the commission, dated from the last harassing behavior or the adverse job action. Failure to take this step will prevent you in most states from filing a lawsuit later.

You don’t need a lawyer to do file a charge with the commissions. Realize, however, that the equal employment opportunity commissions are too busy to do a thorough investigation on all but a few cases. It is a smart idea to have a consultation with a lawyer, before either of you makes a commitment to pursue a lawsuit.
 
Can I sue the harasser too?
 
Not under Title VII or Louisiana law as they currently stand. Sometimes you have state law rights on different theories, such as for assault and battery or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
 
If I have to sue, what can a court do for me?
 
You can ask for monetary damages for your lost wages and benefits, if you lost or left your job because of the harassment. You can also ask the court to require the employer to give you your old job back. You can seek damages to compensate you for your emotional distress and any physical injuries caused by the harassment. (There are limits on these damages, depending on the size of the employer.) In extreme cases, you may also be awarded punitive damages to punish the employer’s bad behavior. Finally, if you win, the employer will be required to pay your attorney’s fees.
 
Sexual Harassment can mean 'same sex' harassment, too.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 96—568
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH ONCALE, PETITIONER v. SUNDOWNER OFFSHORE SERVICES, INCORPORATED, et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[March 4, 1998]

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether workplace harassment can violate Title VII’s prohibition against “discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), when the harasser and the harassed employee are of the same sex.

I

The District Court having granted summary judgment for respondent, we must assume the facts to be as alleged by petitioner Joseph Oncale. The precise details are irrelevant to the legal point we must decide, and in the interest of both brevity and dignity we shall describe them only generally. In late October 1991, Oncale was working for respondent Sundowner Offshore Services on a Chevron U.S. A., Inc., oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico. He was employed as a roustabout on an eight-man crew which included respondents John Lyons, Danny Pippen, and Brandon Johnson. Lyons, the crane operator, and Pippen, the driller, had supervisory authority, App. 41, 77, 43. On several occasions, Oncale was forcibly subjected to sex-related, humiliating actions against him by Lyons, Pippen and Johnson in the presence of the rest of the crew. Pippen and Lyons also physically assulted Oncale in a sexual manner, and Lyons threatened him with rape.

Oncale’s complaints to supervisory personnel produced no remedial action; in fact, the company’s Safety Compliance Clerk, Valent Hohen, told Oncale that Lyons and Pippen “picked [on] him all the time too,” and called him a name suggesting homosexuality. Id., at 77. Oncale eventually quit–asking that his pink slip reflect that he “voluntarily left due to sexual harassment and verbal abuse.” Id., at 79. When asked at his deposition why he left Sundowner, Oncale stated “I felt that if I didn’t leave my job, that I would be raped or forced to have sex.” Id., at 71.

Oncale filed a complaint against Sundowner in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging that he was discriminated against in his employment because of his sex. Relying on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446, 451—452 (CA5 1994), the district court held that “Mr. Oncale, a male, has no cause of action under Title VII for harassment by male co-workers.” App. 106. On appeal, a panel of the Fifth Circuit concluded that Garcia was binding Circuit precedent, and affirmed. 83
F. 3d 118 (1996). We granted certiorari. 520 U.S. ___ (1997).

II

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer … to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e—2(a)(1). We have held that this not only covers “terms” and “conditions” in the narrow contractual sense, but “evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment.” Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “When the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment, Title VII is violated.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination “because of . . . sex” protects men as well as women, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983), and in the related context of racial discrimination in the workplace we have rejected any conclusive presumption that an employer will not discriminate against members of his own race. “Because of the many facets of human motivation, it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other members of that group.” Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977). See also id., at 515—516 n. 6 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616 (1987), a male employee claimed that his employer discriminated against him because of his sex when it preferred a female employee for promotion. Although we ultimately rejected the claim on other grounds, we did not consider it significant that the supervisor who made that decision was also a man. See id., at 624—625. If our precedents leave any doubt on the question, we hold today that nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination “because of . . . sex” merely because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged with acting on behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex.

Courts have had little trouble with that principle in cases like Johnson, where an employee claims to have been passed over for a job or promotion. But when the issue arises in the context of a “hostile environment” sexual harassment claim, the state and federal courts have taken a bewildering variety of stances. Some, like the Fifth Circuit in this case, have held that same-sex sexual harassment claims are never cognizable under Title VII. See also, e.g., Goluszek v. H. P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (ND Ill. 1988). Other decisions say that such claims are actionable only if the plaintiff can prove that the harasser is homosexual (and thus presumably motivated by sexual desire). Compare McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (CA4 1996), with Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, 99 F.3d 138 (CA4 1996). Still others suggest that workplace harassment that is sexual in content is always actionable, regardless of the harasser’s sex, sexual orientation, or motivations. See Doe v. Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (CA7 1997).

We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII. As some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed. Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex” in
the “terms” or “conditions” of employment. Our holding that this includes sexual harassment must extend to
sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements.

Respondents and their amici contend that recognizing liability for same-sex harassment will transform Title VII into a general civility code for the American workplace. But that risk is no greater for same-sex than for opposite-sex harassment, and is adequately met by careful attention to the requirements of the statute. Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at “discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex.” We have never held that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or connotations. “The critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.” Harris, supra, at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to draw in most male-female sexual harassment situations, because the challenged conduct typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is reasonable to assume those proposals would not have been made to someone of the same sex. The same chain of inference would be available to a plaintiff alleging same-sex harassment, if there were credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual. But harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. A trier of fact might reasonably find such discrimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace. A same-sex harassment plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace. Whatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted “discrimina[tion] . . . because of . . . sex.”

And there is another requirement that prevents Title VII from expanding into a general civility code: As we emphasized in Meritor and Harris, the statute does not reach genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite sex. The prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace; it forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the “conditions” of the victim’s employment. “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment–an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive–is beyond Title VII’s purview.” Harris, 510 U.S., at 21, citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. We have always regarded that requirement as crucial, and as sufficient to ensure that courts and juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in the workplace–such as male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirtation–for discriminatory “conditions of employment.”

We have emphasized, moreover, that the objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering “all the circumstances.” Harris, supra, at 23. In same-sex (as in all) harassment cases, that inquiry requires careful consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target. A professional football player’s working environment is not severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field—even if the same behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach’s secretary (male or female) back at the office. The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple
recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed. Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person
in the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.

III

Because we conclude that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.